This makes absolutely no sense. Your conclusions are way off. It's because offenses are advantaged at the college level that bunting is a terrible decision.
On balance, the best college teams have a higher OPS than MLB teams. This is due to an overall lack of pitching depth and talent at the college level. Which means, in simplest terms, a college player is more likely to do something productive at the plate-- e.g. walk or hit.
Take South Carolina, a bad offensive team this year. They still have an OBP of 34%. Which is better than all but 4 MLB teams.
Even with a bad team, you have a reasonable expectation that 34% of the time something good is happen at the plate. Why in God's name would you ever give up a 34% chance for something good for a 100% bad outcome?
On balance, the idea of a "productive" out is a remnant of time when we ignored or avoided relevant information.
I'm not saying college should be looking at bunting every chance they get. The only conclusion I was making that the stats found for MLB can't be applied at the college level.
Makes absolutely no sense?
If we do dig into your logic, you are only applying your % on a single level. The goal is to get runs. Just because 'something good' can happen at the plate 34% of the time doesn't mean you should just hit away. If you take multiple base hits out of the equation; to get a single run by doing something 'good' at the plate means you hitting that 34% mark FOUR times before you score a run.
Ever watch the movie 21? The professor at the beginning gives a simple explanation at the beginning of one of his classes (Monty Hall Problem) This concept is one of the big pieces of why small ball is actually used. The % work out well again. There's a 1/3 chance that you will get a hit. 2/3 chances you will get an out. Let's say you do get a hit. Now, you have a man on base. You technically have to hit that 1/3 3 more times to get the runner in. You can continue to hit and take your chances or change your approach and bunt. Let's be EXTREMELY pessimistic that there's only 1/2 chance you will get to move the runner to 2nd. You are almost for sure getting an out from the bunt. That's still a better chance to move that runner to 2nd than letting him swing away. Even though you now have an out you've change the whole dynamic on the field. Continuing with the single base hits... now you only have to have 2 more hits at 33% to score a run. Before it was 3 hits at 33% with 0 outs.
Moving beyond that, you've got a deeper level of % and situations that you have to account for.
There's always the chance of it actually being a good bunt and the runner making it to first without an out. There could be a throwing error to first and the player on 2nd advances to third or maybe even home.
You've also eliminated an easy potential double play if your 66% non-hit puts it straight into a fielders glove. Your single just turned into two outs.
With a runner on first, there's almost no where on the field that the runner can still tag and make it to second on a pop fly.
If he's on 2nd? Your 66% non-hit to right field STILL did good and pushed the runner to 3rd. Now you just need one more hit at 33% to get that wonderful run.
Again, everything is situational, if you have some batters that have been hitting .400+ for the weekend, chances are the coach isn't going to do it.
Another big concept is simply putting the ball in play to let the defense make a mistake. Simply hitting away hoping for a good outcome doesn't fit well if runs are a rare commodity in a game and fighting against a good pitcher.
South Carolina won the NC in 2010 because of small ball. (and a few clutch hits) Period. Yes, Tanner could have tried approaching it and let his players swing away at let them hit.
If that was the case, it could have been 2006 all over again.
Simply saying it makes no sense goes against a lot strategy baseball is built on.
